A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures - Centre de REcherche sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2024

A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures

Abstract

We consider cooperative games where the coalition structure is given by the set of winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of games models some real-life situations in which some agents have economic performances while some others are endowed with a political power. On this class of cooperative games, the Myerson value has been identified as the Harsanyi power solution associated to the Equal Division power index and has been characterized in the large class of Harsanyi power solutions with respect to the associated power index. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the Myerson value for this class of games without focusing on the whole family of Harsanyi power solutions and therefore, without taking into account any power index. We identify the Myerson value as the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, extra-null player property, and Equal Treatment of Veto.
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Dates and versions

hal-04506426 , version 1 (15-03-2024)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04506426 , version 1

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Clinton Gubong Gassi. A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures. 2024. ⟨hal-04506426⟩

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